own judgements as to

[valislunes]

Mathews and Grewal 9809 In form, this book is a chronicle of Australian fiscal policy, and of the fiscal relationship between the Commonwealth and the States, over the period from 197273 to 199495. In part, therefore, it is a sequel to the work of Mathews and Jay (1972) which covered the period before 1969. A brief introduction, covering the period from 1969 to 1972, is included to fill the gap. The main body of the book is organised in a form suitable for a chronicle. It is divided, like Gaul, into three parts, covering the Whitlam, Fraser and HawkeKeating governments. Each of these parts is organised in the same way, containing chapters on

(i) The Economy and Government Budgets; (iii) Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements; andViewed simply as a reference work, the book is admirable. Its 800 pages include summaries of all the Commonwealth Budgets from 196970 to 199495, of all national and state elections, and, of course, of intergovernmental financial institutions including the Grants Commission and the Loan Council.

As their title indicates, however, Mathews and Grewal have set themselves a more ambitious goal than that of providing a narrative of events. Their central thesis is that Australia's poor economic performance over the period since 1972 can http://www.valentinocheapsale.com/ be attributed, in large measure, to the combination of freemarket economic policies and vertical fiscal imbalance between the Commonwealth and the States. 737) captures the flavour of the argument very well:

'Although the Whitlam government did not explicitly abandon the Keynesian demand management policies which had guided Australian governments so successfully during the 1950s and 1960s, its own high expenditure and wage policies, the oil crisis and the breakdown of the international monetary system required adaptations to the Keynesian approach which neither the Australian nor other governments were interested in making. Instead the Fraser Government committed itself to economic policies based on the monetarist theories of Milton Friedman, which had then come into vogue in AngloSaxon countries. When these failed, the Hawke and Keating governments adopted a laissezfaire appraoch to economic policy based on the supremacy of the market, which conspicuously failed to achieve full employment, economic stability and growth when it was applied.'

This thesis is not developed separately from the narrative. Rather, it constitutes a background assumption that informs the description of events. This approach has both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, it makes for a more interesting work than would have been likely if it were either a studious neutral piece of economic history or yet another denunciation of economic rationalism. On the other hand, it is more difficult to come to grips with an argument presented as a series of comments scattered through an 800page narrative.

Readers will have to make their own judgements as to how far Matthews and Grewal succeed in making out their case. There is no doubt, however, that they supply a historical perspective that is sorely lacking in much current policy discussion, particularly from supporters of the dominant policy orthodoxy. Listening to contemporary statements about the benefits of say, competition policy or labour market reform, it often seems as if the speakers have forgotten that equally optimistic claims were made, in similarly dogmatic tones, for monetary growth rules, floating exchange rates, foreign banks, privatisation and so on.